The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1993/93_7657/93_7657.za

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID LAWSON, PETITIONER v. GARY DIXON,
WARDEN
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 93-7657.  Decided February 28, 1994

  The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
  Justice Blackmun, dissenting.
  At the time of his trial, the record suggested that
David Lawson suffered -significant psychopathology,-
anxiety, depression, hostility, and a likelihood of defi-
cient impulse control.  He generally lacked the ability to
communicate with his attorney or to understand the
nature and seriousness of the charges against him.  He
thought of suicide and once had attempted it.  It is
hardly surprising that he told his sentencing jury: -You
think I done it, gas me.-  3 F. 3d 743, 746 (CA4 1993).
Lawson's counsel, taking his cues from Lawson, neither
investigated nor presented any evidence of his client's
mental problems, which might have established statutory
and nonstatutory mitigation, see N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-
2000(f)(2) (1988) (-[t]he capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of mental
or emotional disturbance-); 15A-2000(f)(6) (-[t]he
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law was impaired-), which, in turn, might have
meant the difference between life and death.
  Lawson asserts in this habeas petition that his
attorney's failure to investigate or to offer mental health
mitigation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g., Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F. 2d 1298,
1303-1308 (CA8), cert. denied, 502 U. S. ___ (1991);
Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F. 2d 1447, 1451 (CA11
1986), cert. denied, 481 U. S. 1042 (1987).  To prevail on
an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show -a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.-  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S.
668, 694 (1984).  The Court of Appeals upheld the
denial of a hearing or relief on this claim because
Lawson had -failed to present clear and convincing
evidence of positive and unequivocal facts which gener-
ate a substantial and legitimate doubt as to his mental
capacity.-  3 F. 3d, at 754.
  In a related claim, Lawson argues that, regardless of
his personal wishes, the Constitution's twin require-
ments of rationality and individualized determinations
command that his jury be presented mitigating evidence.
See State v. Klokoc, 589 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1991);
State v. Koedatich, 112 N. J. 225, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988),
cert. denied, 488 U. S. 1017 (1989); Morrison v. State,
258 Ga. 683, 687, 373 S. E. 2d 506, 509 (1988), cert.
denied, 490 U. S. 1012 (1989).  Finally, Lawson asserts
that the instructions given his sentencing jury would
lead a reasonable juror to understand that the jurors
must reach unanimity on the existence of a mitigating
factor before considering it, in violation of Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988), and McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U. S. 433 (1990).  See Kubat v. Thieret,
867 F. 2d 351, 373 (CA7), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 874
(1989); Brantley v. State, 262 Ga. 786, 794, 427 S. E. 2d
758, 765 (1993); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P. 2d 70, 93
(Wyo. 1991).
  Without deciding the merits of these claims, I conclude
that they cast considerable doubt on the reliability and
constitutionality of Lawson's sentence of death.  Accord-
ingly, even if I did not adhere to the belief that the
death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the
constraints of our Constitution, see Callins v. Collins,
510 U. S. ___, ___ (1994), I would grant Lawson's
petition for certiorari to review these issues.